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BOOK REVIEWS
THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS. By Edward S. Corwin.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936, pp. xi, 276.
For years-prior to the depression, there has been opinion in the United
States, both responsible and irresponsible, to the effect that the power of the
Supreme Court to declare federal legislation unconstitutional should be regu-
lated or nullified. As a result of the depression, views have been voiced to the
effect that the Supreme Court had made of itself a stumbling block in the proper
functioning of our economic system; that the Court had placed the weird ap-
pellation "unconstitutional" on any law that it found to be distasteful; that its
decisions had strengthened "big business" and had helped to emphasize the
powers of dynamic wealth. Some even tried to prove that the Court in the
past had made of its startling errors "un fait ntagnifique".
It would seem that in the presence of this criticism the Supreme Court
would be sensitive in the proper exercise of its great power and would hardly
act so arbitrarily that even members of its own court would be alienated by a
determination of the majority of its judges. Dissenting opinions are known in
judicial pronouncements, but scathing rebukes of a nature heretofore unknown
are to be found in the recent cases, United States v. Jones1 and United States v.
Butler.' In the latter case, the Court held the Agricultural Adjustment Act '
unconstitutional; and if the doctrine of stare decisis should be observed by the
Supreme Court, farm and agriculture have completely and permanently been
withdrawn from federal control by this far-reaching decision. When we are
mindful of the great proportion of our population engaged in agriculture, this
decision with its broad and drastic pronouncements must now be reckoned among
those few judicial acts that are to govern the destiny of the American people.
Inspired by a greater confidence than wise men are taught ever to enjoy in
matters of political economy, the majority in this case spoke its command; but
the minority judges did not remain inarticulate. From Judge Harlan F. Stone's
dissenting opinion, this excerpt is taken: '
"The suggestion that it (the Federal purse) must now be curtailed
by judicial fiat because it may be abused by unwise use hardly rises to
the dignity of argument. So may judicial power be abused. * * * Courts
are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have
capacity to govern. Congress and the courts both unhappily may falter
or be mistaken in the performance of their constitutional duty. But in-
terpretation of our great charter of government which proceeds on any
'298 U. S. 1, - Sup. Ct. - (1936).
"297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
37 U. S. C. A. § 601 (May 12, 1933, Ch. 25, Title I, 48 Stat. 31).
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
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assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of our institutions
is the exclusive concern of any one of the three branches of government,
or that it alone can save them from destruction is far more likely, in
the long run, 'to obliterate the constituent members' of 'an indestructible
union of indestructible states' than the frank recognition that language,
even of a constitution, may mean what it says: that the power to tax
and spend includes the power to relieve a nationwide economic maladjust-
ment by conditional gifts of money."
Now comes this labor of Professor Corwin to declare disappointment at
the presumptuous conduct of the Supreme Court in matters of interstate com-
merce. In the volume under review, it was the purpose of Professor Corwin
to establish, first, that the Supreme Court by its recent decisions has denied to
Congress the absolute right to pass laws with regard to interstate commerce
when the sole congressional motivation for such enactments has been the pro-
motion of the general welfare, and secondly, that the Supreme Court has arro-
gated to itself the right to make the legislative motive and the feasibility of a
federal statute regulating trade between the states the judicially enforceable
test of validity.
It need hardly be said here that according to all established and recognized
standards, the wisdom of an enactment is a problem solely of the law-making
body, and the interpretation of the enactment is inherent in judicial function;
that the only proper basis on which the Supreme Court can declare a statute
to be invalid is that it is contrary to the Constitution.
Students of law and of political economy who will read this volume by
Professor Corwin will probably determine that he has established both of his
propositions. One could almost omit all of Professor Corwin's notes and com-
ments and take the excerpts of decisions that he quotes and from such cases
reach the view that the Supreme Court in recent years, without any basis to be
found in precedent, has taken to itself the power of which Professor Corwin
complains. It would hardly seem the function of a court to be guided by its
pleasure in determining the validity of a statute passed by the law-making au-
thority of the country, and yet, very little more can be said of these arbitrary
views of the Supreme Court declared in recent years on the subject of the
commerce power and states' rights.
Beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden,' decided in 1824, it was declared by the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, that the power
of the Court is plenary with regard to the commerce among the several states,
and that the regulation of such commerce is vested in Congress as absolutely as
though this were not a confederation of states, but were a unitary government.
This view of Chief Justice Marshall was followed even with regard to legisla-
tion that was enacted by the Congress, not as a means of regulating interstate
commerce itself, but in order to regulate the subject matter of that commerce;
and thus, the Supreme Court held the statute with regard to lotteries to be
9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
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constitutional' and expressed the same view with regard to the White Slave
Traffic Act.'
Until 1918, it was common opinion among lawyers that under the declared
views of the Supreme Court, Congress was made the sole judge of the feasi-
bility of any statute that regulated interstate commerce. In that year, however,
came the decision of the Court in Hammer v. Dagenliart, in which the Supreme
Court held a federal statute unconstitutional which sought to regulate the move-
ment of goods made by child labor and sent on an interstate passage. And be-
ginning with that decision, two roads were broken by and for the Supreme
Court in matters of interstate commerce; and no lawyer can now reasonably
foretell on which path the Supreme Court will be* found in its effort to deter-
mine the validity of a particular statute. It may be the road of Gibbons v.
Ogden'9 or the rowd of Hammer v. Dagenhart.0
Thus, in effect, the Supreme Court has created for itself the power to
nullify federal statutes that regulate interstate commerce, when the particular
statute is obnoxious to the views of a majority of the judges.
Professor Corwin asks the question that necessarily arises upon a compari-
son of Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden' and Day's opinion in Hammer
v. Dagenhart: ' "How did the Court ever go from the one to the other; what
were the steps?" And then Professor Corwin replies: "The answer is that
there were no steps; the method of the Court was never so pedestrian. Rather
is it to be compared to that of those Chinese rivers which occasionally abandon
courses they have followed for centuries and proceed to plow a channel to the
sea at sharp angles to the other. Only in the case of the Court, while a new
channel was cut, the old one continued in use."
Many of us have seen or read the play "Of Thee I Sing" with its queer
explanation of the manner in which the judicial function is exercised by the
Supreme Court. That, however, was meant to be a jocular satire, not a political
document; its purpose was to entertain, and entertainment is permissibly achieved
by overtones. Hardly was it to be expected that a conservative and recognized
authority on constitutional law such as Professor Corwin, would speak with
such veiled irony concerning the exercise of authority by the Supreme Court.
And if it should be concluded that his criticism was too severe, the conservative
pen of Chief Justice Hughes, who dissented in the Railroad Retirement Board
case
a
' gives countenance to the treatment that the Supreme Court received at
the hands of Professor Corwin. To give but a single quotation from the opinion
of the Chief Justice: "What sound distinction, from a constitutional stand-
point, is there between compelling reasonable compensation for those injured
without any fault of the employer, and requiring a fair allowance for those who
practically give their lives to the service and are incapacitated by the wear and
Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903).
"Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913).
'247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918).
9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
'°247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918).
9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
'"247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918).
Railroad Retirement Board et al. v. Alton Railroad Co. et al., 295 U. S.
330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935).
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tear of time, the attrition of the years? I perceive no constitutional ground
upon which the one can be upheld and the other condemned." "
To those who have always hoped for the curtailment of the Supreme
Court's power, this volume of Professor Corwin's will serve as aid and com-
fort. There are others, however, who in weighing the strictures against that
tribunal, will at the same time recall the strength of the Supreme Court of the
United States in sustaining the individual's right of freedom of action (Strom-
berg v. California) ; ' its recognition of the freedom of the press against state
limitation or regulation (Near v. Minnesota) ; its intervention in the Scotts-
boro case (Powell v. Alabama) Y Not only in the matter of civil rights but
in its effort to safeguard economic freedom has the Supreme Court justified the
esteem which it enjoys in the American mind, and while the Court is condemned
by some of its own members and by its friends for its decisions in the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act' s and Railroad Retirement Act " cases, its great ser-
vice in the N. R. A. case ' which was decided by a unanimous court, must not
be overlooked.
It would therefore take far more heinous conduct on the part of the Su-
preme Court than that outlined by Professor Corwin before thinking men
should be willing to join forces with those who would end the power of the
Supreme Court in matters of legislation. Nevertheless, it must be recognized
that political institutions are not born into life with prestige, and that an at-
tained prestige, however great, can easily be dissipated.
NATHAN PROBST, JR.*
ComaORATE REORGANIZATIONS. Three volumes. By John Gerdes. Chicago:
Callaghan & Co., 1936, pp. xliv, 1-816; pp. xix, 817-1760; pp. ix, 1761-
2859.
BANKRUPTCY FORMS AND PRACTIcE. By Abraham I. Menin and Asa S. Herzog.
New York: Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., 1936, pp. ix, 871.
Following the commercial debacle of 1929, a demand arose throughout the
country for legislation to alleviate the distressed condition of the business
world, saddled with debts and obligations incurred in the halcyon days of
1928 and 1929.
This demand first found expression on March 3, 1933, in the enactment of
Sections 73, 74 and 75 of the Bankruptcy Act for the relief of the individual
business man and farmer.
2" Id. at 384.
"283 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931).
" 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
"'287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55 (1932).
'United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
" Railroad Retirement Board et al. v. Alton Railroad Co. et al., 295 U. S.
330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935).
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837
(1935).
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